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BALANCING ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS AND
ENERGY DEMANDS: A COMMENT ON CALVERT CLIFFS'.
COORDINATING COMMITTEE, INC. V. AEC
A. DAN TARLOCKt
The demand for energy is rapidly increasing at a time when public
tolerance of the side-effects produced by the discharge of residuals from
power plants is decreasing.' The accommodation of environmental and
energy demands can take many forms, ranging from technological solu-
tions, such as cooling towers and wet scrubbers to "desulphurize" stack
gas, to a conscious political decision to accept a lower level of material
abundance.2 In my opinion the best long-run method of reducing the
use of our air and the use of land and water resources as sinks lies in
recycling the fuels and materials used in production, in the use of less
residual-generating fuels and production processes and eventually in
regulatory policies devised both to encourage these solutions in the
design and operation of all new power plants and to discourage sole
reliance on the waste assimilative capacities of our natural resources.'
Congress is very slowly coming to grips with the implications of the
relationship between energy and environmental policies.' For example,
Congress is in the process of informing itself about the link between
national energy policy and environmental quality levels, but it will be
several years before the issues now being identified in committee studies
will be translated into legislation.5 The federal government is also ac-
celerating the flow of funds into research for more efficient methods of
t Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
1. See Hearings on the Environmental Effects of Producing Electric Power Before
the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. pts. I-II (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Environmental Effects]. For a history and an analysis of American energy pro-
duction, see P. SPORN, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERS, AND ECONOMICS (1969).
2. See J. FORRESTER, WORLD DYNAMICS (1971).
3. The most complete statement of this position is A. KNEESE, R. AYRES & R.
D'ARGE, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A MATERIALS BALANCE APPROACH 1-15
(1970).
4. See CLEAN ENERGY NEEDS, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
H.R. Doc. No. 92-118-117, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as CLEAN EN-
ERGY]. The message proposes that all important energy resource development programs
be consolidated within a new Department of Natural Resources.
5. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 91sT CONG., 2 D SESS., SOME EN-
VIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF NATIONAL FUELS POLICIES (Comm. Print 1970). For an
introduction to the dimensions of the problem, see Baldwin, Public Policy on Oil--An
Ecological Perspective, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 245 (1971). The problem of substituting a
"clean" fuel such as natural gas for a "dirty" one such as high sulfur coal are discussed
in Note, The Four Corners Power Complex: Pollution on the Reservation, infra at 704.
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energy protection.6 However, at the present time and for the foresee-
able future conflicts between energy demands and environmental con-
siderations are being resolved in the context of regulatory proceedings
which review individual utility management choices for the location of
large scale nuclear and fossil fuel plants.
Initially, agencies charged with the protection of environmental
quality tried to deal with the problem by the establishment of environ-
mental quality standards, but this strategy has not been successful in re-
solving the conflicts This failure has occurred because of legitimate
questions concerning the inadequacy of current standards, because site
location challenges raise broader questions of whether there is and, more
importantly, should be a demand for the amount of energy which utilities
consider themselves obligated to provide, and no other forum exists
to litigate these questions.8
Several states have attempted to provide a more systematic accom-
modation between energy demands and the environmental impact of
energy production by enacting power plant siting and planning statutes, 9
and federal legislation which would require all states to enact such laws
is now pending. 0 But, at the present time because regulation of power
plants is fragmented among all levels of government, "no public agency
[is] in a position to consider all of the public's interest and say 'Yes, you
6. The current research priority is the liquid metal fast breeder reactor which will
produce more fuel than it consumes. CLEAN ENERGY, supra note 4, at H. 4716. For fis-
cal 1973, 182,000,000 dollars has been requested. Environmentalists have criticized cur-
rent research priorities on the ground that they slight other environmentally more pre-
ferable energy sources such as magnetohydrodynamics. See Conservation Foundation
Letter 6-7, Feb., 1972.
7. Environmentalists are likely to continue to rely on judicial procedures to assess
the environmental impacts of power plants because they are suspicious of power plant
siting legislation. Regulatory agencies and utilities often welcome siting legislation as a
means of decreasing the delay in the licensing process. See Ramey & Murray, Delays and
Bottlenecks in the Licensing Process Affecting Utilities: The Role of Improved Proced-
ures and Advance Planning, 1970 DUKE L.J. 25. Environmentalists are somewhat justi-
fied in fearing that new procedures will be used to choke off in-depth analysis of en-
vironmental impacts and to encourage environmental standard-setting agencies to com-
promise.
8. Some lawyers view intervention as a means of mobilizing public support to win
a political victory "not attainable within the narrow confines of an agency proceeding,"
and thus consciously seek to broaden the issues raised in a hearing or judicial proceeding.
See Like, Multi-Media Confrontation-The Environmentalists' Strategy for a "No-Win"
Agency Proceeding, 13 ATOMIc ENERGY L.J. 1 (1971).
9. See Note, State Regulation of Power Plant Siting, infra at 742.
10. See, e.g., H:R. 5277, H.R. 13966, H.R. 11066, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972);
see Hearings on H.R. 5277 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Communications,
of the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See generally
Tarlock, Tippy & Francis, Environmental Regulation of Power Plant Siting: Existing
and Proposed Institutions, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 502 (1972).
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are authorized to put it here' as well as 'No, don't put it there.' "" As
a result, pending the design of more optimum institutions, one of the
most constructive roles that courts can play in the accommodation of
energy and environment conflicts is to provide criteria for the allocation
of regulatory responsibility between levels of government and agencies
and to formulate standards to review the procedures agencies use to
resolve these conflicts.
When a power plant is challenged the courts are asked to decide
three basic questions: (1) Did the utility and the authorizing agency
sufficiently consider the environmental impact of the plant? (2) Given
that power plant regulation is fragmented among all levels of government
and that legislative consideration of the appropriate allocation of authority
between the agencies with some power to regulate the utility has not
been undertaken, what is the appropriate governmental unit or combin-
ation of units which should exercise final authority over the utility's
decision as to location and design of the plant? (3) Do the utility's
power projections justify the need for a plant at the time it is -pro-
posed ?12 To date, courts have not been asked to decide if we should adopt
a neo-Malthusian policy and limit resource use to avoid future scarcities
and consequent declines in this country's or the world's level of material
progress. However, in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v.
AEC,1  the 'Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently
considered the principles relevant to decide the first two questions and,
by inference, the third. The court's decision broadly construed the ap-
plicability of the National Environmental Policy Act of 196914 (NEPA)
to the AEC's licensing jurisdiction and procedures. The decision, there-
fore, provides an opportunity to examine the role the courts should take
in promoting the more rational consideration of energy-environment con-
flicts under existing legislation.
11. ENERGY POLICY STAFF, OFFICE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, ELECTRIC POWER AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 15 (1970). See also Kaufman, Power for the People-and by the
People: Utilities, the Environment and the Public Interest, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 867 (1971).
12. See Brooks, Millstone Two and the Rainbow: Planning Law and Environmen-
tal Protection, 4 CONN. L. REV. 54 (1971).
13. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The lawsuit was not an appeal from the
granting of construction permits for the plant; thus, construction is proceeding on the
Calvert Cliffs plant and operational testing is projected for the fall of 1972. For a good
case study of the utility's decision to construct the plant and the AEC regulatory process
with emphasis on radiological effects see Bronstein, The AEC Decision-Making Process
and the Environment: a Case Ssudy of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Plant, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q.
689 (1971).
14. -42 U.S.C. § 2321 et seq. (1970).
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BACKGROUND OF THE LITIGATION
Nuclear plants have a major comparative environmental advantage
over fossil fuel plants because they do not discharge particulate matter
or oxides of sulfur or nitrogen into the atmosphere. However, the threat
of damage to an ecosystem from thermal discharge is greater because
nuclear plants are less efficient than fossil fuel plants; thus a comparably
sized nuclear plant discharges up to fifty per cent more heat into the
receiving waters. Attention was first focused on the regulation of
thermal pollution in 1968 when Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D.-Me.)
held a series of hearings,15 although several states had programs before
that time." These hearings revealed that both the states and the federal
government had given the establishment and enforcement of thermal
water quality standards a low priority.
By 1970 most states had temperature standards,'17 but many govern-
ment scientists charged that the permissible limits were too high." Yet,
even these high initial limits would require extensive plant modifications
by many utilities, because the temperature f the water discharged by once-
through cooling is considerably higher than the temperature limitations
imposed under the standards.1 However, much of the problem of a
thermal discharge often is not that it threatens to cause immediate and
substantial damage to an ecosystem but that the long-term, cumulative
effects of the discharge may prove detrimental. Existing concepts of
pollution which require a causal connection between an activity and
liability may not permit an agency to enforce its standards against a
utility, because no damage in the conventional sense can be established."0
Indeed, the information necessary to set standards which have a wide
margin of safety against future unforeseen damage is still not presently
available. Thus, the threat of an enforcement action was not a sub-
15. Hearings on Thermal Pollution Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollu-
tion of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Thermal Pollution].
16. See Note, Cold Facts on Hot Water: Legal Aspects of Thermal Pollution, 1969
Wis. L. REV. 253, 263-69 (discussion of early state efforts to regulate thermal dis-
charges).
17. A report of the Department of the Interior indicated that seventeen state stand-
ards had not been accepted. Dep't of the Interior Water Quality Standards (mimeo Jan.,
1970). See Bloom, Heat-A Growing Water Pollution Problem, BNA ENVIRONMENT
REP., Monograph No. 4, May 1, 1970.
18. Thermal Pollution, supra note 15, pt. I, at 238.
19. See AEC, STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF PRODUCING
ELECTRIC POWER 128-29 (1969) [hereinafter cited as AEC STATEMENT].
20. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota, 2 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP. CASES
1135 (D.C. Minn. 1970).
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stantial spur to force utilities to consider alternative sites and design
modifications. 1 In addition, other elements of temperature standards
were too vague to influence site locations. 2
In 1969, in response to the decisions of several midwestern
utilities to construct plants on the shore of Lake Michigan, the federal
government began to formulate stricter thermal standards. The federal
government originally proposed to limit temperature rises to one degree
in the lake, " but under pressure from the utilities they shifted their
focus from water receiving standards to the elimination of direct dis.
charges into the lake through the requirement of closed cycle systems and
cooling towers. 4 However, only Indiana accepted the proposed federal
standard; Illinois and Wisconsin still allow existing plants to operate
but will prohibit new ones subject to a study of existing plants; Michigan
remains undecided. 5
The problems of insufficient information and lack of a clear federal
thermal standards policy were compounded because state agencies had
little control over the sites and plant designs chosen by utilities in advance
of operation. Most states require a permit to discharge wastes into
public waters, but utilities generally did not apply for these permits until
21. For a good statement of .the deficiences of existing thermal discharge research
for standard-setting purposes, see AEC STATEMENT, supra note 19 at 245, 267-75.
22. For example, one crucial decision in setting thermal standards is whether mix-
ing zones should be allowed and, if so, how they should be defined. If a mixing zone is
allowed, the utility is allowed to raise the water temperature above the level of the
standards in the immediate vicinity of the plant, for the temperature limitations only
apply at the edge of the mixing zone. When the Florida Power & Light Company de-
cided to locate a large plant on Biscayne Bay, which had an average natural temperature
at the upper tolerance levels of many species, Florida required only that the mixing zone
be "reasonable," whereas current proposed regulations would confine plants to ocean sites
and would not allow them on the edge of bays which are more shallow and hence more
ecologically vulnerable. See Thermal Pollution, supra note 15, pt. II, at 728-42 (state-
ment of Claude Kirk, former Governor of Florida). See generally Comment, Thermal
Electri Power and Water Pollution: A Siting Approach, 46 IND. L.J. 61, 84-90 (1970).
23. The recommendation was based on a government laboratory study which con-
cluded that no significant discharge of waste heat into Lake Michigan should now be
permitted. GREAT LAKES FISHERY LABORATORY, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, PHYSICAL
AND ECOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF WASTE HEAT ON LAKE MICHIGAN, unnumbered document
document (1970).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). See ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY LABORATOR)§, CALI-
FORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, PEOPLE, POWER AND POLLUTION: ENVIRONMENTAL
AND PUBLIC INTEREST ASPECTS OF ELECTRIC POWER PLANT SITING 40-41 (1971). The
compromise is discussed in Reis, Environmental Activism: Thermal Pollution-AEC and
State Jurisdictional Considerations, 13 B. C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 633, 666-69 (1972).
25. Bulletin of the Lake Michigan Federation 4 (No. 12, Dec. 17, 1971). The EPA
has now decided not to enforce the standard in court, so the question of whether closed
cycle cooling systems will be required is still open and will be raised at the Lake Michi-
gan Enforcement Conference scheduled for the summer of 1972. Bulletin of the Lake
Michigan Federation 1 (No. 4, Mar. 31, 1972).
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after the site and design were chosen."6 State procedures, therefore,
make it very difficult to obtain an adequate review of the environmental
impacts of the plant at the state level. Environmental groups and some
states turned instead to the AEC, hoping to obtain an early and com-
prehensive review of environmental impacts.2"
The AEC was a logical choice primarily because of its two-step
licensing procedure, which provides for review of the location and design
of a plant prior to the commitment of a substantial portion of a plant's
costs, which today run to 250 million dollars.2 From an environmental
perspective, however, the choice of the Commission as a forum has several
major drawbacks. The AEC was created to guide the development of
nuclear energy, both in response to the lack of knowledge about its
potential for nonmilitary use after World War II and because of an
awareness of its destructive as well as constructive potential. The AEC
has been closely regulated and supported in Congress by the Joint Com-
nittee on Atomic Energy, which has been a firm believer in the gospel
of nuclear energy. The Commission's enabling legislation and operating
policy reflect a dual and possibly conflicting mandate, for the AEC is
charged with both the promotion and regulation of nuclear energy. As
unbiased a source as the staff report to the Administrative Conference
observes that:
While these two purposes may not be intrinsically incom-
patible, their conjunction does distort the AEC's ability to
make the broad social assessment of the extent to which, con-
sidering its special risks and advantages, society should rely on
nuclear power to meet energy needs. The AEC's commitment
26. Maryland's problems regulating the Calvert Cliffs plant were the subject of
Senate hearings in 1970. The first public disclosure of the plant site was made on June
1, 1966, by an application for a zoning change, but the utility did not file for a State De-
partment of Water Resources permit to discharge until after construction was underway
in late 1969, although the utility had started some research studies and had been in con-
sultation with the department before filing. Hearings on S. 2752 Before the Subcomnn.
on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 95-446 (1970).
27. James L. Oakes, the Attorney General of Vermont, testified in 1968 that in-
tervention before the AEC was necessary because "it is now clear that the proceeding be-
fore the AEC for a construction permit is the only substantive point of which review of
all factors relating to the proposed plant can, and perhaps should, be made." Thermal
Pollution, supra note 15, pt. I, at 317, 319.
28. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2235 (1970), requires a license granted
only after a public hearing, before a plant can be constructed; objections can be raised
when only about two per cent of the total investment has been committed. See Ellis &
Johnston, Licensing of Nuclear Plants by the Atomic Energy Commission, 13 AToMic
ENERGY L.J. 101, 112 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Ellis]. Another license is required
after the plant is completed but before it starts to operate.
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to the development of nuclear energy is likely to lead it to be
unwilling to impose requirements that will make nuclear energy
non-competitive with other energy sources.29
The AEC's historic attitude toward the environmental impact of a plant
-aside from radiological hazards-reflects the dangers of entrusting
regulation to a mission agency with a built-in conflict of interest. Prior
to NEPA, the AEC excluded nonradiological considerations from their
licensing jurisdiction and viewed public hearings as an opportunity to
convince the populace about the benefits of nuclear energy rather than
as a forum to decide whether a given location was the best possible
environmental choice within the range of alternatives.
This jurisdictional position of the Commission was challenged in
1969, and the First Circuit held that the Atomic Energy Act of 195480
confined the AEC's jurisdiction to questions of radiological health-
primarily because the Joint Committee had consistently refused to enact
legislation specifically broadening their jurisdiction." The Commission's
constricted view of its mission subsequently was considered by two of
the Senate's major enviornmentalists in their respective committees, and
they came to different conclusions. Senator Muskie, chairman of the
Public Works Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, decided that
the Commission's dual responsibility would prevent it from ever weighing
environmental considerations equally with those for the provision of
nuclear energy, and thus more environmentally sensitive agencies should
be given a veto over the AEC. Thereafter, he secured the enactment of
§ 21 (b) of the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970.82 Section 21 (b)
prohibits a federal agency from issuing a license unless the applicant
29. Id. at 126-27. The internal separation of regulatory from promotional activities,
the use of outside professionals to review license applications in the Advisory Committee
on Reactor Safeguards and the independent atomic safety and licensing boards which re-
view an application before the Commission can issue a license should be sufficient to
preclude a court from holding that the Act is an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive power. See Bayside Timber Co. v. Board of Supervisors, I ELI ENVIRONMENTAL L.
RPTS. 20425 (Cal. D. Ct. App. 1971), which held that a statute allowing a board com-
posed primarily of industry representatives to regulate timber cutting was unconstitu-
tional because the legislature failed to supply standards or safeguards to guard against
abuse of the delegated power. The role of the ACRS with respect to Calvert Cliffs is
criticized in Bronstein. supra note 13, at 718.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1970).
31. New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
962 (1969). Prior to the litigation the Commission did recognize some responsibility to
consider nonradiological environmental impacts and circulated the license applications to
federal agencies such as the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife in the Department
of the Interior. See Shapar, AEC Implementation of Recently Enacted Environmental
Legislation, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 73, 86 (C. Hassett ed. 1971).
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (1) (1970).
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presents a certificate from a state or interestate agency that the proposed
discharge will not violate applicable water quality standards. 8 Senator
Henry 'M. Jackson (D.-Wash.) desired to establish general requirements
for all agencies that affect the environment and considered the AEC's
jurisdictional position in the context of NEPA.
THE DECISION
The AEC, in its post-NEPA regulations,"4 refused to consider water
quality standards if the licensee presented a proper 21 (b) certification
and did not require hearing boards to make an independent environ-
mental review unless issues were affirmatively raised by the staff or
parties to the proceeding. Calvert Cliffs' was an action by several en-
vironmental organizations to review the Commission regulation im-
plementing NEPA and to enjoin the construction of the Calvert Cliffs'
plant in Maryland. Judge J. Skelly Wright, writing for a unanimous
panel, invalidated both provisions of the AEC's regulation as incon-
sistent with NEPA procedural duties, which were described as not in-
herently flexible:
We believe the Commission's rule is in fundamental con-
flict with the basic purpose of the Act. NEPA mandates a
case-by-case balancing judgment on the part of federal agencies.
In each individual case, the particular economic and technical
benefits of planned action must be assessed and then weighed
33. The initial certification will be valid for all licenses required unless the state or
other appropriate agency notifies the agency that:
[t]here is no longer reasonable assurance that there will be compliance with
applicable water quality standards because of changes . . . in (A) the con-
struction or operation of the facility, (B) the characteristics of the waters into
which such discharge is made, or (C) the water quality standards applicable to
such waters. This paragraph shall be inapplicable in any case where the appli-
cant for such operating license or permit has failed to provide the certifying
State, or if appropriate, the interstate agency or the Administrator, with notice
of any proposed changes in the construction or operation of the facilty with
respect to which a construction license or permit has been granted which
changes may result in violation of applicable water quality standards.
33 U.S.C. § 1171(b) (3) (1970)., See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Dia-
mond, 3 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.-CAsEs 1903 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).34. The AEC's regulations implementing NEPA initially provided that AEC
would only forward the license application to other interested agencies for comment and
would prepare its impact statement on the basis of the comments rather than consider
environmental issues in license proceedings. 35 Fed. Reg. 5463 (1970). The regulations
were then revised to require the applicant to submit some environmental information, but
environmental considerations were still excluded from licensing proceedings. 35 Fed. Reg.
18469 (1970). The Calvert Cliffs regulations, which in part reversed this policy, were
adopted in December, 1970. 35 Fed. Reg. 18469 (1970).
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against the environmental costs; alternatives must be con-
sidered which would affect the balance of values. 5
The necessity for an "independent," "rather finely tuned and systematic
balancing" was found in NEPA § § 102 (a) (a) and (c)," which require
that in formulating policy and administering programs all agencies must
consider the environmental impact of their decisions and any alternatives
which are available.
The Commission first argued that certification by agencies with
a special environmental expertise meets whatever procedural requirements
§ 102 imposes, but this was rejected as inconsistent with the mandated
balancing analysis because:
Certification by another agency that its own environmental
standards are satisfied involves an entirely different kind of
judgment. Such agencies, without overall responsibility for
the particular federal action in question, attend only to one
aspect of the problem: the magnitude of certain environ-
mental costs. They simply determine whether those costs
exceed an allowable amount. . . . Certifying agencies do not
attempt to weigh that damage against the opposing benefits.
Thus the balancing analysis remains to be done."
Second, the Commission argued that § 104 required it to defer to state
standard-setting agencies. Section 104 provides that:
Nothing in Section 102 or 103 shall in any way affect the
specific statutory obligations of any Federal agency (1) to
to comply with criteria or standards of environmental quality,
(2) to coordinate or consult with any other Federal or State
agency, or (3) to act, or refrain from acting contingent
upon the recommendations or certification of any other Federal
or State agency."
The court's construction of § 104 is arguably inconsistent with the
legislative history of the relationship between NEPA and § 21 (b) of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act."9 The two bills emerged from
35. 449 F.2d at 1123.
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4322(2) (a), (c) (1970).
37. 449 F.2d at 1123.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 4334 (1970).
39. See Comment, Land Mark Decision on the National Environmental Policy
4ct: Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee 'v. Atomic Energy Comm., 1 ELI EN-
VIRONMENTAL L. RPeR. 10125, 10127-29 (1971).
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separate committees but were considered together in the Senate in 1969.
Senator Muskie was concerned that under NEPA the AEC would not
be bound to require a § 21 (b) certification."° As a result, a compromise
was reached with Senator Jackson, and § 104 was added to NEPA.
Senator Jackson's explanation of the compromise supports the AEC's
position:
The compromise worked out between the bills provides that the
licensing agency will not have to make a detailed statement on
water quality if the State or other appropriate agency has made
a certification pursuant to section 16(c) [now 21(b)].
The language of this section is designed to insure that the
provisions of section 16, and particularly section 16(c)
of S.7 are consistent with the requirements of section 102 of
S.1075. Section 16(c) of S.7 would have the effect of exempt-
ing the Corps of Engineers and the Atomic Energy Commission
and some other agencies from the requirement [in S.1075]
for a detailed statement on the environmental impact of pro-
posed actions involving any discharge into the navigable waters
of the United States. [This sentence is taken from the com-
promise statement of the two committees. 115 Cong. Rec.
29058-59 (1969).] Under the terms of section 16(c) of S.7
as now drafted, the State or other appropriate organization
would be charged with certifying that any discharge is in sub-
stantial compliance with appropriate water quality standards.
This certification would be a condition precedent to obtaining
any Federal license or permit required by law before making
any discharges into the navigable waters of the United States. 1
The court dealt with the legislative history of § 104 in a strained
fashion. First, it created two classes of damage and held that § 104
speaks only to one of them, while NEPA mandates consideration of both
classes:
[C]ertification does not mean that they found no environ-
mental damage whatever. In fact, there may be significant
40. "The concept of self-policing by Federal Agencies which pollute or license pol-
lution is contrary to the philosophy and intent of existing environmental quality legisla-
tion." 115 CONG. Rac. 29053 (1969). Speaking of the AEC, he argued "these agencies
have always emphasized their primary responsibility making environmental considera-
tions secondary in their view." Id.
41. Id. at 29053, 29056 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Jackson). See Note, The Regula-
tion of Nuclear Power After the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24
RUTGERs L. REv. 753, 763-68 (1971).
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environmental damage (e.g., water pollution), but not quite
enough to violate applicable (e.g., water quality) standards. 2
In fact, given this assumption, the court's conclusions that (1):
Water quality certifications essentially establish a minimum
condition for granting a license. But it does not require the
Commission to grant a license once a certification has been
issued. It does not preclude the Commission from demanding
water quality control from its licensees which are more strict
than those demanded by the applicable water quality standards
of the certifying agency."3
and (2) that this construction of § 104 was consistent with the Muskie-
Jackson compromise follow quite logically. The flaw in the analysis is
the distinction between discharges which violate water quality standards
and those which conform but still cause significant environmental damage.
The distinction misconceives the concept of pollution or environmental
damage as it is used in setting standards. The National Technical Advi-
sory Committee on Water Quality Criteria recommends that temperature
criteria be based on the capacity of the most sensitive species to tolerate
increases in heat, for the standards are designed to preserve the diversity
and stability of an ecosystem.44 The real basis of the decision, then, is a
judicial recognition of the current allegation that water quality standards
are set too low.
Second, the court simply ignored the explanation of Senator Jackson,
which the AEC argued permitted agencies to forego some NEPA pro-
cedures in the consideration of water quality, by describing the legisla-
tive history as "relatively meager and vague."4 The traditional canon
of statutory construction, that the court should look to all relevant
evidence in determining the purpose of the legislation, was rejected in
favor of an application of the plain meaning rule.46 Despite the courts
invocation of the plain meaning rule, the holding can be justified neither
by a literal reading of § 104, which on its face is vague, nor in the con-
text of its legislative history. Rather, the result is an example of the
42. 449 F.2d at 1123.
43. Id. at 1125 (emphasis in original).
44. The major source of temperature criteria is FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CON-
TROL ADM'N, WATER QUALITY CRITERIA, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL ADVISORY
COMM. TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 31, 42-43 (1968).
45. 449 F.2d at 1126.
46. Judge Wright wrote, "This rather meager legislative history, in our view, can-
not radically transform the purpose of the plain words of section 104." Id. at 1124.
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"creative" judicial interpretation in the characterization of legislative
purpose which was urged by Judge Jerome Frank in his essay on the
analogy between the romantic style of orchestra conducting and statutory
interpretation.
Calvert Cliffs' is the first major court of appeals opinion construing
NEPA, and the balancing it mandates expands previous constructions
of the Act." The decision seems premised on two assumptions. The first
is that the calculus of environmental decision making is no more com-
plicated than the process of assigning rights and liabilities between
individuals which courts undertake in the development of common law
and statutory doctrines. Thus, the court's emphasis on the desirability
of a single agency balancing all the relevant factors can be explained as
an assumption that the problem is of the same order as remanding a
tort decision on the ground that the trial court gave improper jury
instructions. The second and related assumption is that the model of
the judicial process-the constant self-conscious search for dispute-
resolving criteria-is the proper model to apply to control the dis-
cretionary decision making delegated to licensing agencies such as the
AEC. Since the courts are constitutionally precluded from deciding ad-
47. Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 1259 (1947). See also Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and the Dimen-
sions of Legislative Meaning, 36 IND. L.J. 414 (1961).
48. Prior to Calvert Cliffs', the most important case interpreting NEPA was En-
vironmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark.
1971), which enjoined the construction of a dam on the ground that the impact statement
did not contain the information on environmental damages of nondevelopmental alterna-
tives required by § 102. The Corps partially conceded the inadequacy of its statement,
for no new studies for the project were made after NEPA, and the principal issue was
whether NEPA could be applied retroactively. The court held that it could but tenta-
tively limited NEPA to requiring the production of new information rather than pro-
duction plus a balancing:
At the very least, NEPA is an environmental full disclosure law. The Congress,
in enacting it, may not have intended to alter the then existing decisionmaking
responsibilities or to take away any then existing freedom of decisionmaking,
but it certainly intended to make such decisionmaking more responsive and more
responsible. . . . The record should be complete. Then if the decisionmakers
choose to ignore such factors, they will be doing so with their eyes wide open.
Id. at 759.
But see Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 3 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.-CASES 1687
(M.D.N.C. Feb. 14, 1972). The court refused to enjoin a Corps of Engineers dam and
reservoir on the grounds that the impact statement was inadequate. The Corps had in-
cluded the "very damaging testimony" of plaintiffs' expert witness, and the court held,
distinguishing Environmental Defense Fund:
The primary reason that the impact statement meets the requirement of full
disclosure is because the defendants included in the statement the deposition of
plaintiffs' expert witness.
Id. at 1689. For a summary of early NEPA cases, see Yost, Implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act, 3 Sw. L.J. 88, 98-106 (1971).
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ministrative controversies on the merits, 9 it is normal that they should
instead seek to control the process of decision.5" This is desirable, for the
underrepresentation of environmental interests in agency decision making
is well known, and judicial intervention is necessary to promote a more
rational process. But the balancing approach of Calvert Cliffs' ignores
the complexities of environmental decision making and the limits of
reliance on process as a means of changing ultimate results. There is a
danger that the courts may reduce NEPA to a mechanical check-list for
agencies to follow and, thereby, the substance of agency policy and its
application will remain unchanged. In short, there is a danger that NEPA
impact statements will produce nothing except delay-and a vast amount
of paper to be recycled-in the administration of federal programs.
The remainder of this article will examine the theory of NEPA and
the AEC's implementation of Calvert Cliffs', in an attempt to determine
if the Act can produce the balancing mandated by the decision. Further,
it will compare the court's approach to other methods of environmental
decision making to determine if the concept of balancing is a meaningful
and desirable approach to the resolution of environmental conflicts.
HISTORY AND ANAYLSIS oF NEPA
The basic scientific theory behind NEPA is that ecological con-
siderations should be given more weight in decisions to interfere with the
environment, because life support systems have a limited tolerance to
absorb the stress of modification by tecnology and human activity and
thus overuse may result in deterioration of these systems, with con-
sequent damage to human life or at least the range activity open to
future generations. NEPA also gives recognition to an increased
societal taste for higher amenity levels. The Act is a commitment to
the fundamental belief that:
Alteration and use of the environment must be planned and
controlled rather than left to arbitrary decision. Alternatives
must be actively generated and widely discussed. Technological
development, introduction of new factors affecting the environ-
ment, and modifications of the landscape must be planned to
maintain diversity of plants and animals. Furthermore such
activities should proceed only after ecological analysis and
projection of probable effects. Irreversible or difficult
49. For a discussion of the doctrine of separation of powers in an environmental
context, see Jaffe, Book Review, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1562 (1971).
50. See Frankfurter, Reading of statutes-Some Reflections, 47 COLUM. L. REv.
527, 530, 535 (1947).
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to reverse changes should be accepted only after the most
thorough study. 1
These are worthy goals, but they cannot be realized in the near
future because we are only beginning to develop theories with which to
analyze problems within this framework. NEPA is intended to restruc-
ture existing methods of decision making which affect the environment,
primarily by stimulating the development of benchmark criteria against
which intervention can be measured. It is thus necessary to keep in mind
that the major impact of NEPA is likely to be long-run rather than
immediate, despite the reams of paper in the form of impact statements
and regulations it has generated, for the Act aims at nothing less than
the "achievement of an efficient dynamic equilibrium between man and
his environment. 5
2
Federal legislation was necessary because the creation of program,
mission-oriented agencies has insured that these environmental con-
siderations have been systematically underrepresented in most short-
and long-range decision making." Existing agencies were established
to supervise the development of our natural resources consistent with
the ethic which has prevailed throughout this country's history and, thus,
they tended to overstress the benefits of development and to explore insuf-
ficiently the less environmentally detrimental alternatives to current
methods of meeting their programmed objectives. The recognition of
environmental values is also difficult because the arguments against
present development made in most environmental controversies are often
unprovable assertions that there is a possible risk of long-term damage to
an ecosystem or that future generations will assign higher values to
nondevelopment than do present generations. These considerations are
difficult to quantify in dollar terms and are not protected through
organized markets because the present bidders are fragmented and no
one bids for future generations except, on occasion, legislative bodies.
Furthermore, challanges to nuclear power plants often raise "either-or"
rather than "how much" problems. The issue, from an environmental
perspective, is whether unique resources or ecosystems will be impaired
or threatened, not how much of an activity should be allowed. Asking
51. STAFFS OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS & HOUSE COMm.
ON SCIENCE & ASTRONAUTICS, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., CONGRESSIONAL WHITE PAPER ON
NATIONAL POLICY FOR ENVIRONMENT 18 (Comm. Print 1968).
52. Sears, The Steady State: Physical Law and Moral Choice, in THE SUBVERSIVE
SCIENCE: ESSAYS TOWARD AN ECOLocY OF MAN 395, 401 (P. Shepard & D. McKinley
eds. 1969).
53. See Sax, Emerging Legal Strategies: Judicial Intervention, 389 ANNALS 71, 74
(1970).
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decision-makers to choose between a project and no project (as opposed
to a project with strict conditions of operation) further contributes to
the underrepresentation of environmental values. Thus, environmental
values are generally ignored by the cost-benefit formulas which agencies
try to use to develop objective, nonpolitical criteria for choosing among
alternatives.
There are three strategies which stop short of legislative considera-
tion of each controversy and which can be used to restructure decision
making to redress undervaluation of the environment. Initially, the
range of information decision makers are required to consider can be
increased. This is a relatively neutral reform; the decision to increase
information is primarily a commitment to a more rational process qua
process than to a new pattern of substantive results, since no decision
is generally made about the weight to be attached to the new informa-
tion. It can be assumed, however, that if new information is made avail-
able decision makers will respond, in many instances, by modifying or
prohibiting the activity.
Second, the legislature can decide to withdraw certain resources
from development or can decide to give environmentally sensitive agencies
a veto over the authority of agencies whose primary mission is develop-
ment. Although this has historically only been done with respect to
areas of high scenic attraction such as national parks and river systems,
proposed power plant siting legislation and national land use planning
legislation would encourage the preservation of ecologically sensitive
areas in their existing state.54 The third strategy is to establish back-
ground standards and allow an activity so long as it does not exceed
those standards. This is a theoretically effective method of controlling
the discharge residuals, although it is a difficult to administer. How-
ever, at the present time we do not have the necessary scientific infor-
mation to establish standards that accurately reflect the harm which
various discharges pose over the long run; we must, therefore, rely on
standards that err on the side of safety. Since we cannot model the
effects of many activities on actual ecosystems, these activities are not
susceptible to reduction to technical criteria." But if delegated discretion
54. See ALI, A MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 8-402(3) (g) (Tent. Draft No.
3, 1971). Veto powers were recognized by a recent California decision which held that
Public Utility Commission enabling legislation did not preempt the licensing of power
plants and that both a regional air pollution control authority permit and a certificate of
public convenience and necessity had to be obtained before a plant could be authorized.
Orange County Pollution Control Dist. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 4 Cal. 3d 945, 484 P.2d
1361, 95 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1971).
55. See Joint House-Senate Colloquium to Discuss a National Policy for the En-
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is to be meaningfully structured from an environmental perspective, a
common basis must be devised by which to compare environmental
costs with developmental benefits. Unless some method of quantifying
environmental costs and benefits is found which will allow alternatives
to be ranked, the concept of balancing will have very little meaning. "A
national system of environmental cost accounting expressed not only in
economic terms but also reflecting life-sustaining and amenity values
in the form of environmental quality indicators. . . ." is needed.5"
The designers of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
Senator Jackson and Professor Lynton K. Caldwell of Indiana University,
did not envision that the courts would play a major role-at least in the
first years of its administration-in enforcing the Act. Professor Cald-
well is a leading public administration scholar and his writings and
background papers for the Senate Interior Committee focus almost ex-
clusively on the role of administrative agencies in policy formulation and
decision making.17  Only after NEPA was passed did lawyers begin
to argue that the Act was jurisdictional and imposed procedural burdens
on the agencies, enforceable by private citizens, to prepare an adequate
record to support their actions. The evolution of the Act's fundamental
concepts can be traced through Professor Caldwell's writings. In a
seminal 1963 article, Environment: A New Focus for Public Policy?, 8
he argued that "[n]o massive research is required to document the in-
adequacy of our environmental decision making,"5 which he defined
as "our national tendency . . . to deal with environmental problems
segmentally,"" as opposed to comprehensively. The basic reason advanced
vironment: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs & the
House Comm. on Science & Astronautics, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 73, 75 (1968) (statement
of S. Dillon Ripley, Secretary, Smithsonian Institute).
56. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 90TH CONG.,
2D SESs., REPORT ON A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 14 (Comm. Print 1968) ;
reprinted 115 CONG. REc. 3701, 3703 (1969). An impact statement is not inadequate if
the agency has failed to develop methods to quantify intangible values. See Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (com-
panion case to Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749
(E.D. Ark. 1971)).
57. Prof. Caldwell was critical of the American preference for government by
judges and has predicted that the adoption of an environmental ethic would mean that
"litigation would increasingly give way to administrative adjudication in the enforce-
ment of law and the settlement of disputes over environmental and natural resource
questions." Caldwell, Authority and Responsibility for Environmental Administration,
389 ANNALS 107, 113 (1970). See also Caldwell, Administrative Possibilities for Envi-
ronmental Control, in FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS OF NORTH AMERICA 648, 666-67 (F. Dar-
ling & J. Milton eds. 1966).
58. 23 PUB. AD. REV. 132 (1963).
59. Id. at 135.
60. Id. at 134.
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for this inadequacy was that authority to modify the physical environ-
ment was fragmented among numerous technical mission agencies.
Professor Caldwell saw the choice of institutions to protect and enhance
the environment as one between planning and administration. He argued
that administration was preferable to planning because it "implies
action"'" and that environmental administration had two major advant-
ages: (1) It would provide "a common denominator among differing
values and interests"62 and (2) "A policy focus on the environment
in its fullest practical sense would make more likely the consideration
of all major elements relevant to an environment-affecting decision.""
There was little further consideration of the problems of restructuring
existing decision making, and these basic concepts, in their unfinished
form, eventually became the crux of NEPA.
The early drafts of NEPA were directed more toward filling a
well-documented gap in the state of scientific knowledge relevant to
informed environmental decision making and to the creation of a high
level governmental unit to formulate "national policies to foster and
promote the improvement of environmental quality,"64 than to influence
the administration of specific programs. Professor Caldwell and others
criticized this approach on the ground that the legislation itself should
contain "an adequate policy statement, accompanied by explicit pro-
visions for its implementation."65 In response, § 102 was added 6 but,
beyond the section's general guidelines, little concrete analysis was given
to the question of whether a coherent, comprehensive national environ-
mental policy could be formulated by superimposing an idealized model
of decision making on a maze of mission agencies. The Senate Report
on NEPA recognized that a national policy did not exist but focused
more on specific defects in the administrative process (such as the "lack
of legislative mandate and responsibility" that all agencies "consider the
consequences of their action on the environment") 6 7 than on the more
61. Id. at 137.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 138.
64. 115 CONG. REC. 1780 (remarks of Sen. Jackson) (1969). For a more detailed
legislative history, see SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS, REPORT TO Ac-
COMPANY S. 1075, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 91-296,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 10-12 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
65. Major Alternatives for Institutional Reforms Designed to Inpro've the Govern-
ment's Capacity to Manage the Environment, Statement by Lynton K. Caldwell Before
the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs on S. 1075 and Related Measures 12
(Apr. 19, 1969).
66. Section 102 was added in executive session on June 18, 1969. SENATE REPORT,
supra note 64, at 11.
67. Id. at 13-17.
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fundamental' problem of trying to develop a consensus as to priorities
for the use of biospheric resources. Decisions about optimum population
level distribution and economic growth rates may have to be made before
a meaningful set of priorities of resource utilization can be developed.
The response of the federal government to the current energy
shortage illustrates the problems of trying to factor environmental con-
siderations into existing departmental and agency programs in the
absence of any consensus about fundamental questions. The Government
is proceeding on a number of fronts to increase the amount of fuel
available for energy production and has, in general, either narrowly
interpreted NEPA or argued that, on balance, energy demands out-
weigh "speculative" environmental considerations. In the absence of a
decision about such fundamentals as rate or distribution of growth, at
least the costs we are willing to bear for increased environmental quality,
there is little in NEPA that constrains the Government from the inter-
pretations they have made.
On the floor, Senator Jackson recognized the weakness of vague
policy declarations, but argued that NEPA was more, emphasizing its
procedural effects :
A statement of environmental policy is more than a statement
of what we believe as a nation. It establishes priorities and
gives expression to our national goals and aspirations. It
provides a statutory foundation to which administrators may
refer to it for guidance in making decisions which find environ-
mental values in conflict with other values.
What is involved is a congressional declaration that we
do not intend, as a government or as a people, to initiate actions
which could endanger the continued existence of health of
mankind: That we will not intentionally initiate actions which
will do irreparable damage to the air, land, and water which
support life on earth. . . . If there are to be departures
from this standard of excellence they should be exceptions to
the rule and policy. And as exceptions they should be justified
in light of the public scrutiny as required by Section 102.6"
68. 115 CONG. REc. 40416 (1969). It has been argued on the basis of this state-
ment that NEPA shifts the burden of persuasion to the initiator of an activity which
might be environmentally detrimental. Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of
Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUT-
GERs L. REV. 230, 267-68 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hanks]. Granted this interpreta-
tion of NEPA, the shift will have little relevance in many conflicts because, even under
liberal definitions of "pollution," it is often difficult to prove that a proposed activity will
cause irreparable damage. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota, 2 BNA ENVIRONMENT
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The Act itself begins with a sweeping statement that man and nature
should exist in "productive harmony" and declares that it is a "con-
tinuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practical
means, consistent with other considerations of national policy . "
to improve and coordinate its activities so that "the Nation may-
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as
trustee of the environment for succeeding gener-
tions;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, produc-
tive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing sur-
roundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the
environment without degradation, risk to health
or safety, or other undesirable and unintended
consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural
aspects of our national heritage, and maintain,
wherever possible, an environment which sup-
ports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and re-
source use which will permit high standards of
living and a wide sharing of life's amenities;
and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and
approach the maximum attainable recycling of
depletable resources.
(c) The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy
a healthful environment and that each person has a respon-
sibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement
of the environment.6"
The Senate version of § 101(c) stipulated that every person had a
right to a healthful environment, but the final language was substituted,
over the objections of Senator Jackson, by the Conference Committee.71
REP.-CASES 1135 (1970), in which the discharge of tanconite tailings in Lake
Superior was held not to constitute pollution because no irreparable injury was estab-
lished after a battle of scientific experts. The background of the litigation is discussed
in D. ZwicK & M. BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND 140-66 (1971). Cases such as this
only underline the need for better scientific models on which to base environmental
standards and for social accounting procedures.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
70. H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The Senate version would have insured that private citizens had standing
to challenge activities of the federal government that have a substantial
detrimental impact on the environment. 2 The final version weakened
the argument that the Act intended to create the environmental interest
required under current concepts of standing. However, the courts are
increasingly impatient with the argument that standing should be a
bar to a hearing on important legal questions which meet the constitu-
tional case or controversy requirement, and § 101 (c) has not been
used by courts to deny standing under NEPA. Regardless of the change
in the language of § 101(c), moreover, NEPA increases the rights that
citizens have to an improved environment, for, as Professor Christopher
Stone has argued:
In this regard, the lawyer is constantly aware that a
right is not, as the layman may think, some strange substance
that one either has or has not. One's life, one's right to vote,
one's property, can all be taken away. But those who would
infringe on them must go through certain procedures to do so;
these procedures are a measure of what we value as a society.
Some of the most important questions of "right" thus turn
into questions of degree: how much review, and of which sort,
will which agencies of state accord us when we claim our "right"
is being infringed ?
Thus, although NEPA may not contain a consistent set of resource use
priorities to allow agencies and courts to fashion substantive environ-
mental rights,"4 Senator Jackson's statement of NEPA's purpose in-
dicates that the Act was intended to create a more rational process for
the evaluation of activities which may be detrimental to the environ-
ment. Although new procedures have a limited capacity to control
decision-making processes, the imposition of procedural safeguards is
CONFERENCE REPORT].
71. 115 CONG. REC. 40416 (1969).
72. Hanks, supra note 68, at 231-51.
73. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for 'Natural Ob-
jects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 482 (1972).
74. In Calvert ClifIs', Judge Wright wrote:
The reviewing courts probably cannot reverse a substantive decision on the
merits, under Section 101, unless it can be shown that the actual balance of costs
and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to
environmental values.
449 F.2d at 1115.
But see Cohen and Warren, Judicial Recognition of the Substantive Requirement of
the National Environmental Poly Act of 1969, 13 B. C. IND. & CoM. L
Rxv. 685 (1972).
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a significant recognition of public environmental rights and is a firm
basis for judicial intervention in the administration of NEPA.
The heart of NEPA is § 102(c), which requires that an environ-
mental impact statement be prepared for "every recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. -.
Section 102 has been characterized by Senator Jackson and the Senate
Report as "action-forcing,"7 and this phrase has been used by com-
mentators and by the court in Calvert Cliffs' to support the conclusion
that NEPA requires a comprehensive balancing by the initiating agency.
The concept, as originally presented to the Senate Committee by Professor
Caldwell, did not, in my opinion, speak to the question of balancing, and
current interpretations obscure some of the difficult questions raised
when impact statements by existing agencies are relied upon as a means
of restructuring decision making.
As noted previously, Professor Caldwell was concerned that if the
Act declared only a vague set of national goals which were not capable
of implementation, it would be ineffective. He therefore urged that a
procedure be included to make the policy have an "action-forcing,
operational aspect." He offered several examples of the need for an
"action-forcing" policy:
For example, it seems to me that a statement of policy
by the Congress should at least consider measures to require the
Federal agencies, in submitting proposals, to contain within
the proposals an evaluation of the effect of these proposals upon
the state of the environment, that in the licensing procedures
of the various agencies such as the Atomic Energy Commission
or the Federal Power Commission or the Federal Aviation
Agency there should also be, to the extent that there may not
now exist fully or adequately, certain requirements with re-
spect to environmental protection, that the Bureau of the Budget
should be authorized and directed to particularly scrutinize
administrative action and planning with respect to the impact
of legislative proposals, and particularly public works proposals
on the environment.7
7
75. 42 U.S.C. § 4232(c) (1970).
76. 115 CoNG. REc. 40416 (1969) ; SENATE REPORT, supra note 64, at 9. See gen-
erally Donovan, The Federal Go'vernment and Environmental Control: Administrative
Reform on the Executive Level, 12 B.C. IND. & Coi. L. REV. 541, 551-56 (1971).
77. Hearings on S. 1075, S. 237 & S. -752 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior &
Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (1969).
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Senator Jackson agreed and added:
I am wondering if we might not broaden the policy provision
in the bill so as to lay down a general requirement that would
be applicable to all agencies. I think the immediate ex-
ample that comes to mind and has to yours already by the state-
ment is that the Atomic Energy Commission, in granting per-
mits or licenses in connection with nuclear power plants, should
be required to make an environmental finding."7
However, Senator Jackson's adoption of Professor Caldwell's criti-
que of NEPA led to a subtle but significant shift in the meaning of the
"action-forcing" concept. Professor Caldwell's statement stresses the
utility of an "action-forcing" mechanism aimed at both short- and long-
range considerations to effectuate long-term and fundamental changes in
the standards and procedures by which crucial federal decisions affecting
the environment, such as budget allocation for research and technology
and legislative program structure, are made."9 Senator Jackson stresses
more the need for immediate, but less fundamental, implementation of
an "action-forcing" policy by expanding the jurisdiction of existing
agencies.
The "action-forcing" policy is written into § 102, which provides
that "[t]he Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent
possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United
States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies
set forth in this act. . ."" This language replaced attempts by the
House to provide that NEPA would neither increase nor decrease agency
authority. The Conference Report stated that the purpose of the change
was to make it clear that all agencies should comply with NEPA "unless
the existing law . . . makes full compliance with one of the directives
78. Id. at 117.
79. Senator Jackson subsequently criticized the failure of the Council on Environ-
mental Quality to develop these standards and procedures:
The Council's preoccupation with environmental "brush fires" has detracted
from other major responsibilities assigned to it under the Act. The Council,
for example, has made little progress toward developing procedures for measure-
ment and evaluation of environmental indicators. It has thus far made little
contribution to the tremendous job of improving policies and procedures and
developing an analytical methodology for making the hard tradeoff decisions be-
tween preservation and development that will measure our ultimate success in
environmental management.
Jackson, The Environment and the Congress, 11 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 403, 409 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Jackson].
80. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
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impossible."'" Section 103 reinforces § 102 by requiring all agencies
to review their enabling legislation to determine if there are any deficien-
cies which prohibit full compliance with NEPA. These two sections
have been used as the basis for the conclusion that NEPA is a grant of
jurisdictional authority to agencies and departments,8 2 but it is equally
possible to characterize the Act as a congressional declaration that in
construing their statutory authority to comply with NEPA all reasonable
doubts should be resolved in favor of compliance.
Other legislative history also illustrates the conflict between NEPA
as a means of restructuring decision making over the long term and as a
means of achieving immediate modification of agency policies. The Senate
Report explained that § 102 was intended to foster interdisciplinary team
planning and "the development of an adequate methodology for evaluat-
ing the full environmental impacts and the full costs of federal actions."8
The concept of an impact statement was then defined in terms of its
function and the findings that would be required. The statement's func-
tion is "to establish action-forcing procedures which will help insure
that the policies enunciated in Section 101 are implemented. "84
The findings required by § 102 fall into at least three categories. First,
factual findings that the environmental impact has been studied are re-
quired. Second, conclusions about questions which are not capable of
being reduced to factual findings or for which information is not available
are required.8" Finally, the agency must evaluate the proposal in terms
of its own policies and if its policies are environmentally detrimental it
must suggest alternatives, because if the statement discloses "unresolved
conflicts over competing and incompatible" resource uses, "it shall be
the agency's responsibility to study, develop, and describe appropriate
alternatives to the recommended course of action."8 8
The duty to study less environmentally detrimental alternatives is
one of the most innovative but difficult to define concepts in the legisla-
tion. It is, in part, based on a series of judicial decisions starting with
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,8 7 which held that a com-
81. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 70, at 9-10. For further legislative history, see,
Hanks, supra note 68, at 254-57.
82. See Hanks, supra note 68, at 251-57.
83. SENATE REPORT, supra note 64, at 19.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 20-21. E.g., irreversible resource commitments.
86. Id. at 21. 42 U.S.C. § 4232 (c) (iii) (1970).
87. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). On remand
the license was reissued, 44 F.P.C. 350 (1970), and the Second Circuit held that the
Commission adequately balanced power and environmental considerations and complied
with NEPA. 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971).
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plete administrative record in cases where environmental values were
threatened must include a study of less detrimental alternatives which
could be implemented by the agency. However, shortly after Calvert
Cliffs', the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the application of
NEPA to off-shore oil and gas leasing to relieve the current fuels short-
age and indicated that the duty under NEPA is much broader than that
imposed by Scenic Hudson. In Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Morton,88 the court held that the impact statement must discuss the
environmental consequences of alternatives and that "[t] he mere fact that
an alternative requires legislative implementation does not automatically
establish it is beyond the domain required for discussion. ,"" The
court found the discussion of alternatives inadequate, in part, because it
did not consider the possibility of eliminating oil import quotas. This
holding opens the possibility that agencies and departments will be re-
quired to undertake limitless and unmanageable inquiries. However, the
court attempted to qualify the scope of its decision by a rule of reason:
In the last analysis, the requirement as to alternatives is
subject to a construction of reasonableness, and we say this
with full awareness that this approach necessarily has both
strengths and weaknesses. Where the environmental aspects of
alternatives are readily identifiable by the agency, it is reasonable
to state them-for ready reference by those concerned with the
consequences of the decision and its alternatives. As already
noted, the agency may make references to studies already made
by other agencies (including impact statements) or appearing
in responsible journals."
Natural Resources based its holding on the ground that a broader
statement of alternatives is required when the proposed action is part of
a coordinated plan to deal with a broad problem. This expanded duty is
consistent with NEPA but it fails to recognize that the consideration of
alternatives must take place within the context of previously agreed upon
choices. Otherwise the range of possible issues to be studied might be
endless. The basic choices are usually made at the legislative level and
the resulting enabling legislation allows an agency to limit the range
of alternatives to manageable proportions. It is reasonable for a court
to require an agency to expand its consideration of the environmental
impact of its activities but I would argue that it is not reasonable to
88. 3 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.-CASES 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
89. Id. at 1564.
90. Id.
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require an agency to initiate basic legislative reforms or fundamental
changes in program content. It is, of course, proper and desirable for
Congress or the Executive to do so when it is considering the problem,
but if courts follow the lead of Natural Resources the result may be
administrative paralysis, for decision makers will be asked to balance
considerations that are beyond their ability to define and rank."
The Senate Report did not envision that agency or departmental
evaluation of the impact statement would become the primary means of
enforcing NEPA. The purpose of the impact statement was not to
require all departments and agencies to undertake the kind of final balanc-
ing mandated in Calvert Cliffs', but to ensure that
the agency shall develop information and provide descriptions
of the alternatives in detail for subsequent reviewers and
decision-makers, both within the executive branch and in
Congress, to consider the alternatives along with the principal
recommendation.9 2
Title III of NEPA creates a three-member, full time Council of Environ-
mental Quality Advisors to carry on continuing studies and analysis
related to the status of the environment" and to encourage the develop-
ment of an effective system for monitoring environmental indicators."
Day-to-day decision making and conflict resolution among departments
was to be left to the Bureau of the Budget, the President or those to
whom his authority has been delegated.
This model is appropriate for program and legislative proposals
made by departments within the executive branch, but it does not fit the
activities of the independent regulatory commissions;95 at least some
91. See Statement of Roger C. Cramton Before the Senate Comm. on Interior &
Insular Affairs & the Comm. on Public Works on the Effect of N.E.P.A. on Decision-
making by Federal Administrative Agencies 25-34 (Mar. 7, 1972) [hereinafter cited as
Cramton].
92. SENATE REPORT, supra note 64, at 21.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 4344(2), (5) (1970).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 4372(d) (3) (1970). See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 27-28 (1971). The Council's
enforcement authority is hampered by the fact that they have no authority to require an
agency to file a § 102 statement. See Hearings on Federal Agency Compliance with
Sections Io2(2)(0) & 102 of NEPA before the Subcomm. on Fisheries & Wildlife Con-
servation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
ser. 41, pt. 1, at 13 (1970).
95. The President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization, the Ash Council,
would solve this problem by transferring many of the independent agencies' functions to
new agencies directly responsible to the President. See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL
ON ExEcUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED
INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES (1971). For critical commentary on the report, see
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members of the Senate thought that more effective review of regulatory
agencies would be provided by giving more environmentally sensitive
agencies a veto over their decisions. Thus, on the floor of the Senate,
Senator Boggs (D.-Del.) asked whether NEPA "deals with what we
might call the environmental impact agencies rather than the environ-
mental enhancement agencies, such as the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Administration. ,.96 Senator Muskie answered that it did and
observed that § 102 was intended
to bring pressure [on the AEC but] [o]f course this legislation
does not impose a responsibility or an obligation on those
environmental-impact agencies to make final decisions with
respect to the nature and extent of the environmental impact
on their activities. Rather than performing self-policing func-
tions, I understand that the nature and extent of environmental
impact will be determined by environmental control agencies."'
AEC IMPLEMENTATION OF CALVERT CLIFFS':
AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
The Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, Russell
Train, recently testified before the joint Senate Interior and Public
Works oversight hearing on NEPA that the Act has five great merits:
It gave federal agencies authority in exercising their re-
sponsibilities to give positive protection to the environment in
their programs.
It opened up the Government decision-making process to
view and comment by relevant federal and state expertise and
the public.
It required agencies to articulate their decisions and the
basis for these decisions, resulting in more informed decision-
making.
It required the agencies to develop in-house expertise in
varied disciplines that will in time develop institutional view-
Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 U. VA. L. REv. 1069 (1971)Robinson, On Reorganizing the Independent Regulatory Agencies, 57 U. VA. L. REv. 947(1971).
96. 115 CONG. REc. 40425 (1969).
97. Id. The CEQ Guidelines rely on this legislative history and exempt sections ofthe Environmental Protection Agency. from compliance with § 102(c). Statement onProposed Federal Actions Affecting the Environment: Guidelines, § 5(d), 36 Fed. Reg.
7724, 7725 (1971).
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points more sympathetic to environmental, as opposed to purely
programmatic, values.
It "carries with it court enforceability of its requirements,"
and cannot be ignored by top level agency management.9 8
The importance of NEPA in promoting a more rational process of federal
decision making cannot be underestimated, but there is a danger that the
procedural requirements which the courts, following the lead of Calvert
Cliffs', are imposing on departments and agencies may ultimately frustrate
the purpose of the Act. The basic utility of NEPA is that it provides
a mechanism to produce better information about the environmental
dimensions of important federal decisions.99 But, the basic weaknesses
of the Act are that it neither provides a meaningful set of resource use
priorities nor alters the basic missions of existing departments and
agencies.' These weaknesses limit the effectiveness of the impact state-
ment procedure, for, as the Act is interpreted by the courts, agencies and
departments are now being asked to make decisions for which impact
information is not available and to decide questions outside the scope of
their normal mission.
In response to these demands, agencies are developing procedures to
implement NEPA which instead of changing their narrow, mission-
oriented approach to decision making (which was the original reason
for the Act) are merely giving better explanations of what they have
been and are doing. 1 ' Perhaps I am unduly cynical about the ability of
an act such as NEPA to bring about the fundamental change in attitudes
about the resource use it was designed to foster, but the manner in
which Calvert Cliffs' has been implemented illustrates the limits of
reliance upon a common law of NEPA procedures.
The court's requirement that the final balancing be undertaken by
the agency does cure one substantial defect in early agency implementation
98. 3 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.-CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1324 (1972).
99. The unresolved conflicts NEPA ignores are illustrated in a recent article
by Sen. Jackson in which he argued that NEPA did not include a no-growth policy or
any cutbacks in scientific and technological advances. Jackson, supra note 79, at 413-15.
100. Testifying before Congress during NEPA oversight hearings, the Chairman
of the Administrative Conference argued that NEPA does not alter the promotional
mission of line agencies. 3 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.-CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1354(1972). Licensing agencies are urging Congress to amend NEPA because agency re-
sources are being strained by compliance.
101. Environmental intervenors continue to distrust the AEC's decision-making
procedures, since the crucial decisions are still made through staff negotiation with the
applicant prior to the public hearing-the first time other parties can participate in the
decision. The important balancing has already been done, and the intervenor must face a
united staff, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards and applicant. Ellis, supra note
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of NEPA. If the Act is to be successful, it must substantially improve
the quality of information available to agencies about the costs and bene-
fits of alternative cources of action. It is unlikely that this information
will be generated, however, if a licensing agency can rely on an applicant's
initial impact statement throughout all or even the initial stages of
review. The applicant's statement is likely to be self-serving, for it
will be generally perceived and prepared as an adversary document. Thus,
if the agency is performing its role of deciding whether the applicant
has demonstrated that a project is consistent with the public interest as
defined by NEPA, the agency must independently gather and analyze
information. The regulations adopted after Calvert Cliffs' require the
AEC to do this, and the Second Circuit recently correctly applied Calvert
Cliffs ot the Federal Power Commission." 2
The problems with NEPA's improved process approach are
illustrated by the AEC guidelines issued after Calvert Cliffs'. The Com-
mission, which had just acquired a new and more flexible chairman,"'
expressly accepted the responsibility that the court imposed. Each ap-
plicant is required to submit an environmental report which "discusses"
the requirements of § 102 and includes:
a cost-benefit analysis which considers and balances the en-
vironmental effects of the facility and the alternatives available
for reducing or avoiding adverse environmental effects, as well
as the environmental, economic, technical and other benefits
of the facility. The cost-benefit analysis shall, to the fullest
extent practicable, quantify the various factors considered.
To the extent that such factors cannot be quantified, they shall
be discussed in qualitative terms. The Environmental Report
should contain sufficient data to aid the Commission in its
development of an independent cost-benefit analysis covering
the factors specified in this paragraph.'
The Director of Regulation will then prepare a draft detailed statement
of environmental considerations, and after the review process a final
28, at 127-28. The frustrations of challenging the AEC are described in Large, Is Any-
body Listening? The Problem of Access in Environmental Litigation, 1972 Wis. L. REv.
62 (1972). See generally Murphy, Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards: An Experi-
ment in Administrative Decision Making on Safety Questions, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
566 (1968).
102. Greene County Planning v. FPC, 2 ELI ENVIRONMENTAL L. RPTR. 20017 (2d
Cir. 1972).
103. Dr. James R. Schlesinger replaced Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg as Chairman last
year. See comment, 25 VAND. L. REv. 258, 271 1 (972).
104. 10 C.F.R. § 50, App. D, at 260 (1972).
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detailed statement will be prepared. This statement requires:
a discussion of problems and objections raised by Federal, State
and local agencies or officials and private organizations and
individuals and the disposition thereof. The detailed statement
will contain a final cost-benefit analysis which considers and
balances the environmental effects of the facility and the alter-
natives available for reducing or avoiding adverse environ-
mental effects, as well as the environmental, economic, tech-
nical and other benefits of the facility. The cost-benefit
analysis will, to the fullest extent practicable, quantify the
various factors considered. To the extent that such factors
cannot be quantified, they will be discussed in qualitative terms.
In the case of any proposed licensing action that involves unre-
solved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available re-
sources, the Detailed Statement will contain an analysis,
pursuant to section 102(2) (D) of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, of alternatives to the proposed licensing
action which would alter the environmental impact and the
cost-benefit balance. Compliance of facility construction
or operation with environmental quality standards and require-
ments (including, but not limited to, thermal and other water
quality standards promulgated under the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act) which have been imposed by Federal, State
and regional agencies having responsibility for environmental
protection will receive due consideration. In addition, the en-
vironmental impact of the facility will be considered in the cost-
benefit analysis with respect to matters covered by such stand-
ards and requirements, irrespective of whether a certification
from the appropriate authority has been obtained (including,
but not limited to, any certification obtained pursuant to section
21 (b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act).'
Environmentalists have been uneasy with the AEC guidelines because
traditional cost-benefit analysis, developed to evaluate water resource
projects, systematically excluded intangible costs, such as the value of
nondevelopment to preserve the scenic beauty or ecology of an area, and
overestimated the developmental benefits of the project.0 6 The argument
105. 10 C.F.R. § 50, App. D, at 261 (1972).
106. Cost-benefit analysis seeks to simulate a demand curve for the goods and
services to be produced by a public investment. Cost-benefit analysis is limited in its
ability to solve problems because:
Knowledge of man's environmental needs and relationships and of ecological
relationships generally is not presently sufficient to support this comparative
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has therefore been raised that under Calvert Cliffs', "softer" environ-
mental considerations will be submerged if they can be balanced against
the benefits of development. Some of the Commission's responses to
Calvert Cliffs' and district court applications of it confirm this fear.1"7
calculus to the extent needed for wisdom and rationality in environmental
decisionmaking.
L. CALDWELL, ENVIRONMENT, A CHALLENGE TO MODERN SOCIETY 176 (1970) [herein-
after cited as CALDWELL, ENVIRONMENT]. Further, conventional cost-benefit techniques
cannot measure such elements of real individual income as the option demand for a re-
source:
This demand is characterized as a willingness to pay for retaining an option to
use an area or facility that would be difficult or impossible to replace and for
which no close substitute is available. Moreover, such a demand may exist
even though there is no current intention to use the area or facility in question
and the option may never be exercised.
Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. EcoN. REV. 777, 781 (1967). Knetsch,
Value Comparisons in Free-Flowing Stream Development, 11 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 624
(1971), argues that recreational benefits from projects such as reservoirs and power
plants which include a beach or park are often overestimated because the accounting
fails to take into account substitute facilities within the area.
107. The response of the AEC to the problem of applying NEPA to projects under
construction before the passage of the act indicates that, in many instances, legislative
relief rather than the development of 'new decision-making procedures will be the
method it will choose to cope with its expanded duties. Pre-Calvert Cliffs regulations
did ont require a full NEPA review (if a construction permit application was issued be-
fore March 4, 1971). The Commission's current regulations follow CEQ guidelines and
recent cases, holding that NEPA can be applied retroactively to projects not completed
at the time the Act became applicable. However, they authorize the Commission to grant
interim operating licenses during the period of ongoing NEPA environmental review
and balancing. Thus, the environmental impacts of plants started prior to Jan. 1, 1970,
would be considered at the operation license hearing which occurs after the plant is en-
tirely constructed. These guidelines were invalidated as inconsistent with Calvert Cliffs'
in Izaak Walton League of America v. Schlesinger, 2 ELI ENVIRONMENTAL L. RP'm.
20039 (D.D.C. 1971), which enjoined the operation of the Quad Cities plant on the
Mississippi River because the jet thermal effluent impact had never been studied. The
Commission's regulations allowed it to consider "the effect of delay in the conduct of
the activity upon the public interest," 10 C.F.R. § 50, App. D, at 263 (1972), in deciding
whether to grant an interim operating license pending NEPA review. The AEC argued
that the interim license was necessary to prevent brown or black outs. Judge Parker dis-
agreed: "The people served by the Quad Cities will not be subject to irreparable in-
jury due to a 'black or brown out' but may have to carry on their conscience the further
degradation of one of the greatest rivers in the world." 2 ELI ENVIRONMENTAL L.
Rpm. att 20042-43.
The AEC then requested legislation amending NEPA to allow it to issue interim
licenses through June, 1973, without having to submit environmental impact statements in
order to meet projected power emergencies. N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1972, at 6, col. 7.
Several bills were introduced at that time. These bills differed widely in their protec-
tion of environmental claims; the Administration bill, H.R. 13731, for example, would
have authorized the AEC to issue full-power operating licenses even if environmental
issues were being contested. The bill finally enacted by Congress allows the AEC to
issue only interim operating licenses and tightly circumscribes their authority. The new
§ 192 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 permits an applicant to apply for a temporary
operating license after the final § 102 impact statement has been filed by the AEC. If
the application for a final operating license was filed prior to September 9, 1972, the
final statement need not be completed; but the applicable requirements of NEPA must
be satisfied prior to the issuance of the temporary license. The Commission must find
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To prevent this it has been suggested that the impact statement should be
kept separate from a formal cost-benefit analysis." 8
The AEC has published proposed guidelines for the preparation of
cost-benefit analyses to be included in the applicant's environmental
impact reports. " The applicant must present cost-benefit analysis for
four alternative plant designs. Alternative one is the plant as constructed
to date; alternatives two and three, the designs which "reduce[s] to a
minimum feasible level with available technology the significant deteri-
mental effects"" 0 to natural water bodies and ambient air and land; and
alternative four is the plant for which licensing is being requested. The
guidelines recognize that cost-benefit analysis is an evolving art
but encourage applicants to provide dollar estimates of the cost impact of
enumerated environmental effects. The cost guidelines follow federal
water resource agency procedures and stress the annual loss of com-
mercially valuable species."
The Commission's concept of cost-benefit analysis does little to
further the objectives of NEPA, which was intended to induce the
analysis of second order, longer-range consequences of decision making.
The issue in power plant siting conflicts is seldom the loss of a commercial
fishery, although that is important. The more significant question is
that the operation will provide "adequate protection of the environment during the period
of the temporary operating license," and that the operation is essential to the adequacy
and reliability of the utility's power supply after duly considering alternative sources of
supply and the foreseeable effects of a power shortage. A hearing is required if any
party so requests; but, in the interest of saving time, it need not follow normal pro-
cedures. H.R. 4655, 118 CONG. REc. H4047-48 (daily ed. May 3, 1972). The identical
bill passed the Senate on May 17, 1972. Id. at S8064.
108. See Natural Resources Council, Comments on the Guidelines of the Council on
Environmental Quality, 2 ELI ENVIRONMENTAL L. RP'rR. 10003, 10004-05 (1972). The
Natural Resources Defense Council recommended that the environmental impact state-
ment be separate from the estimation of project benefits.
109. AEC, PROPOSED GUIDE TO THE PREPARATION OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS TO BE
INCLUDED IN APPLICANT'S ENVIRONMENTAL REPORTS (FOR DEFINED CLASSES OF COM-
PLETED AND PARTIALLY COMPLETED NUCLEAR FACILITIES) (Jan. 7, 1972). Guidelines for
new plants are in preparation.
110. Id. at 4.
111. For example, the guidelines for impact on aquatic biota provide:
(a) A value for productivity per unit of surface area should be derived as the
ratio of an assigned value of the affected fishery to its total surface area. The
assigned value should be the total of values for sport fishing, commercial fish-
ing, shell fishing, and harvesting of other aquatic products. Where available,
values used should be those assigned by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service or
other cognizant agency. Where local site conditions vary significantly from
average conditions in a fishery region, e.g., either by their importance as a
spawning area or their lack of importance, applicants should document their own
estimate of the value of the affected area. Where dollars are used, the weight
by species should be tabulated and reported as well.
Id. at 23.
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whether the plant will cause the long-term deterioration of an ecosystem
and thus threaten our basic life support systems, and the AEC's proposed
cost-benefit guidelines do little to encourage consideration of these
questions.
The guidelines' attempts to reduce environmental costs to manage-
able proportions are, however, understandable, for at the present time
the information required to make the ideal decision NEPA contemplates
is not available. In January, 1972, a conference on the future uses of
Chesapeake Bay identified six information capabilities for effective
decision making. These are "a measurement system to show the situa-
tion of an estuary at a particular time, the capability to analyze and
display measurements, to predict, to test decisions in a sophisticated
model, to command action and to follow up with decisions to see if pre-
dictions are met.""' 2 The conference indicated that a three-year research
effort was underway at Johns Hopkins University to study the use of a
regulator model to help a grapple with the problem of thermal pollution.
The most frustrating paper was delivered by a biologist who observed
that the Calvert Cliffs' plant would produce no observable effect on the
biology of the bay because of the natural variations in the bay, and thus
"such a situation will not enable man to project how many energy plants
should be built on the bay.""' In many-cases it is likely that the AEC
will do exactly what the state agencies are now doing-allow the opera-
tion of the plant, subject to use of the best available biological techniques
to monitor its impact.
The AEC's implementation of Calvert Cliff's suggests to me that
mandating an agency to balance more factors will not substantially in-
crease the weight given to environmental considerations as long as the
agency's basic mission remains unaltered. This is especially true with
an agency such as the AEC, where the agency did not seek the increased
responsibility and implementation requires information beyond the
agency's existing capabilities to obtain." 4 Balancing involves a choice
112. 2 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.-CURRENT DEVELOPMNTS 1114 (1971).
113. Id.
114. In commenting on licensing delays caused by Calvert Cliffs', the New York
State Department of Public Service noted:
The Atomic Energy Commission has only a relatively small staff to carry the
additional work load. . . . At this time [Nov. 1, 1971], no budget action has
been taken to finance extra staff, but approximately 30 people have been trans-
ferred from the General Manager's office to this environmental function ...
The present Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards have not had time to build
up general environmental expertise. ...
NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC SERV., THE NEW YORK POWER SYSTEM GENERATION
AND TRANSMISSION PLANS 1971-1980 15 (1971).
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between competing values which are found in legislative and ad-
ministrative interpretations of an agency's mission. If a class of such con-
siderations is found to be underrepresented in decision making, requiring
an agency to make a choice among a greater range of factors by mandated
balancing is likely to be futile in the long run, so long as the basic values
which control the evaluation of information remain unchanged. The
complexities of trying to balance energy demands against environmental
considerations suggest that such a balancing is an unrealistic objective
for a court or legislature to impose on any single existing agency. Instead,
institutions should be created or recognized which have a clear mandate to
consider the environmental dimensions of a problem and to prescribe
standards and conditions, and to veto particular sites.
A better method of increasing the weight given to environmental
considerations, and thus furthering the purpose of NEPA, would be the
conscious fragmentation of decision-making authority. Speaking about
the analogous problem of applying systems analysis to make budget
choices, the political scientist, Aaron Wildavsky, has argued: "The time
has come to cast aside the myth of comprehensiveness. Theory should be
brought in line with experience. . . . The budget needs to be further
fragmented.""11 Similarly, technology assessment scholars such as Harold
Green have concluded that "the basic problem of building an assessment
institution is, therefore, providing a means whereby the negative factors,
particularly the risks, will be vigorously, effectively, and responsibly
pressed upon the decision-makers.. ,,.""
The experience in power plant siting and other areas, such as the
reduction of jet airplane pollution, 1 7 suggests that the objectives of
NEPA might be better served by giving agencies charged with the assess-
ment of environmental damage and the establishment of quality
standards a veto over the final approval of a project, at least pending the
design of more neutral comprehensive regulatory institutions. If agencies
have a clear responsibility to protect the environment, they are more
likely to press vigorously for environmental quality standards, although
I realize that the danger of compromise is always present. Regulation
115. Wildavsky, Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS, in THE ANALYSIS AND
EVALUATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES: THE PPB SYSTEM, VOL. 3, A COMPENDIUM OF
PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE SUBCOMM. ON ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT OF THE JOINT Eco-
NOMIC COMM., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 835, 858 (Comm. Print 1969).
116. Green, The Adversary Process in Technology Assessment, in TECHNOLOGY As-
SESSMENT: UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF TECHNOLOGICAL APPLICA-
TIONS 49, 51 (R. Kasper ed. 1972). See also Mottur, Technology Assessment and Citizen
Action, in id. at 259.
117. Wall Street Journal, Mar. 31, 1972, at 20, col. 1.
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will remain in the hands of experts, but I am impressed by the fact that
the important plant design modifications for environmental reasons have
occurred not because of AEC action, but through vigorous action by state
environmental agencies. For example, the utility constructing the Quad-
Cities Nuclear Generating Plamt, which was recently the subject of litiga-
tion challenging the AEC's procedures for plants begun prior to 1970,
later agreed with Illinois to construct a twenty million dollar closed-cycle
cooling system for the plant."' It is true that the Calvert Cliffs' procedures
have not been in operation a sufficient length of time to test their impact,
but the initial AEC responses to the case indicate that environmental
considerations will receive no more weight through AEC balancing than
they now do through state standard-setting agencies.
On one level, Calvert Cliffs does not contradict this analysis, for it
holds only that the AEC must balance to determine if standards higher
than those imposed by the state are in order. But on another level, the
case does run counter to this analysis, for it shifts attention to the pro-
tection of water quality away from state and federal standard-setting
agencies in a manner seemingly contrary to the thinking of both Senators
Jackson and Muskie.
In interpreting NEPA the courts must realize that it was designed
to foster new decision-making procedures within the executive branch by
forcing all agencies to deal with the problem of the environment as a
comprehensive whole, but at the present time this goal is beyond the
capabilities of any decision maker because the conceptual tools for this task
are in the process of development." 9 If NEPA is successful, it will be a
result primarily of the ability of the Office of the President, the Council
on Environmental Quality and the Congress120 to both spur and apply a
great deal of necessary scientific research. As NEPA is being ad-
ministered, courts should continue to intervene to monitor cases where the
statute has for all practical purposes been ignored by the body responsi-
118. N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1972, at 20, col. 1.
119. For a discussion of the difficulties of moving from incremental to comprehen-
sive decisionmaking, see CALDWELL, ENVIRONMENT, supra note 106, at 161-90.
120. It is clear that NEPA was not intended to be a means for the Courts to
second guess congressional appropriations, but was intended to be a means of
disclosing to Congress and other decisionmakers all environmental factors in
order that decisions and appropriations could be made with as little adverse ef-
fect on the environment as possible.
Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 3 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.-CASES 1687, 1690
(M.D.N.C. Feb. 14, 1972). Unfortunately, "[olne reaches the reluctant conclusion that
NEPA has been virtually a dead letter in this respect. Congressional committees appear
to be considering legislation although Federal agencies have not prepared and filed the
required statements." Cramton, supra note 91, at 18.
678
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ble for the preparation of § 102 statements ;121 but they must resist the
tendency to reduce it to a set of mechanical principles,12 2 for the result
will be increased delay in administrative decision making and licensing
without a corresponding gain in environmental quality.
121. See, e.g., Hanley v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972), in which it was
held that a one-page memorandum by the General Services Administration, which
concluded that a proposed federal jail and court house annex in New York's Foley
Square would not have any adverse environmental effects, did not meet the requirements
of § 102(c). The court reasoned that "it is 'arbitrary and capricious' for an agency
not to take into account all factors in making its determination." Id. at 468. The
court directed the GSA to make a good faith determination of whether the proposed
facility would significantly affect the quality of the human environment and thus
whether a full impact statement was necessary. The court also held that the GSA's
decision would be subject to review. See also Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
122. For an example of one lawyer's attempt to do this, see Peterson, An Analysis
of Title I of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1 ELI ENVIRONMENTAL L.
Rl-m. 50035, 50039 (1971).
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